But other research identifies important benefits of jury deliberation. In fact, some scholars point to the jury deliberation as the key element of the jury system that promotes its soundness as a fact finder. 10 The opportunity to combine knowledge, compare and debate different understandings of the evidence, and correct one another's errors all enhance the jury's ability to reach a decision consistent with the evidence. Finally, in a minority of trials, the jury ultimately acquits despite the fact that the initial majority favored conviction. 11 Indeed, mock jury research suggests that there is an asymmetrical bias, whereby minorities arguing for acquittal have an easier time convincing their colleagues to find the defendant not guilty compared to conviction-prone minorities who attempt to persuade their acquittal-prone fellow jurors to find the defendant guilty. However, one recent study with actual juries did not find the expected asymmetrical relationship.
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The position of the dissenter, glorified in the classic jury movie Twelve Angry
Men, is arguably one of the most intriguing aspects of jury deliberation. The NCSC study estimated that approximately 6% of criminal juries in state courts and between 2% and 3% of criminal juries in federal courts nationwide are unable to reach a final verdict.
14 But, how many dissenters carry the jury, how many hang the jury, and how many simply conform to the majority's wishes? Because the NCSC study asked a variety of questions about individual jurors' opinions, and recorded the jury's verdict in each case, it is possible to identify dissenters and furthermore to differentiate between dissenters who hold out or who conform. The study permits us to distinguish between the juror who dissents from the majority to hang the jury, and the dissenter who acquiesces, conforming to the majority and allowing a group decision against the dissenter's individual wishes.
This article analyzes what personal and case factors lead a dissenter to conform or to hold out against the majority.
Inspired by social decision scheme and social transition scheme theories, jurors over the duration of their trials has not been extensively studied. Hannaford and her colleagues examined opinion formation in Arizona civil juries. 17 That project, using questionnaires from 1,385 jurors in 172 civil trials, examined jurors' self-reports about when they began leaning toward one side and when they made up their minds about who should prevail in the civil trial. As in other social psychological research on two-sided communication, the civil jurors appeared to wait until they heard arguments from both sides before making up their minds. The evidentiary portions of the trial -plaintiff evidence and defense evidence -and jury deliberation were the most common trial segments during which jurors reported they began leaning toward one side, and at a similar rate (between 19-24% for each). The jury deliberation was far and away the most significant trial segment in which jurors reportedly made up their minds; 46% of the civil jurors identified it.
In Hannaford and colleagues' civil jury project, jurors in complex cases were more likely to delay making up their minds until later in the trial. In addition, jurors in weaker cases took longer to lean toward and decide for a party. The only demographic characteristic to affect opinion formation in civil juries was the juror's educational level.
More highly educated jurors began leaning towards a verdict preference earlier than less educated jurors. However, more educated jurors also changed their minds more often, and reportedly came to a decision at later stages in the trial compared to less educated jurors.
Whether and how these case and individual factors also influence real criminal jury opinion development has not yet been studied and is worth exploring. proof, the evidence, the legal issues, and typical jury size all differ in civil and criminal trials; whether the jury must come to a unanimous decision or may decide by majority vote may differ as well. Thus, the current study evaluates the formation of individual verdict preferences, the impact of deliberation, and the role of the dissenter, employing the NCSC's comprehensive research project on felony juries. 
II. METHODOLOGY

III. RESULTS
A. The Timing of Opinion Formation in Felony Trials
The first analysis examines juror reports of when during the trial they began to lean toward one side and change their mind. Figure 1 displays the self-reported timing of juror opinion development, showing the overlap yet slight variation among trials that resulted in convictions, acquittals, or hung juries. Reportedly, only a small number of jurors (9%) began to lean toward one side or another during the opening statements. Most jurors (53%) reported that they began forming an opinion during the evidentiary period, particularly during the prosecution's case. Another 20% said they only began leaning toward one side once they deliberated with other jurors.
[Insert Figure 1 ] Comparing cases in which the majority of the jury convicted, acquitted, or hung on any charge, jurors' reports of when they began leaning toward one side revealed some differences. When a majority of jurors voted to acquit the defendant, relatively few jurors (15%) reported themselves to be undecided at the time of deliberation. On the other hand, 21% of jurors on juries with a majority to convict and 24% of jurors on juries that hung on a charge said they waited until final deliberations to lean toward one side in the case.
On the questionnaire, jurors indicated whether they changed their minds about their preliminary verdict preferences during the case and if so, when this change would have found the defendant not guilty, but the jury voted to convict (or vice versa), the juror is identified for the purposes of this analysis as a dissenter.
Because the questionnaire included multiple measures of juror and jury verdict preferences, there were multiple ways of characterizing the frequency of dissenting jurors. Recall that jurors provided their initial individual verdict preferences and their final verdict preferences, as well as their one-person jury verdicts, which was the verdict they would have reached had they been deciding the case alone. Recall also that information from the case data form allowed us to determine the jury's final verdict, the jury's final verdict on the first count (usually the most serious charge), and the general verdict measure, the predominant verdict outcome reached by the jury in both single and multiple count cases.
Comparing the one-person jury verdicts to the general verdict measure to obtain a count of dissenters is a conservative approach to estimating their frequency. It should identify the fewest dissenters, because it combines all counts including secondary and lesser included offenses to arrive at a general finding of conviction, acquittal or hung.
Nonetheless, even using this conservative approach, a significant proportion of juries (38%) include dissenters, that is, jurors whose one-person jury verdict was at odds with the general verdict reached by the jury as a whole. This conservative measure of jury dissent is employed in subsequent analyses.
Two other ways of measuring individual dissent are worth noting, however. Over half the juries (54%) included at least one juror whose one-person jury verdict diverged from the final vote of the jury. In addition, we compared the one-person jury verdicts to the jury's verdict on the first count. Although the first count is generally the most serious charge facing the defendant and many previous vote questions referred to the most serious charge, the one-person jury question did not specify "on the most serious charge."
Still, 46% of the juries included at least one juror whose one-person jury verdict differed from the jury's decision on the first count. Thus, depending on what approach is taken to measuring the jury's verdict, from 38% to 54% of juries included at least one juror who reported an individual verdict preference that is contrary to the jury's verdict. The substantial percentage of juries with one-person jury dissenters under any of these measures raises questions about the meaning and significance of ostensible unanimity, an issue to which we return in the Discussion.
When there was a disparity between jurors' one-person verdict and the jury's verdict, most often the minority faction consisted of one or two jurors. Figure 2 illustrates that when the jury acquitted or convicted, typically the most common dissenting faction size was one. However, when the case resulted in a hung jury, the minority faction was often larger. Half of the time the jury hung with three or more dissenters, indicating that a larger minority was less likely to acquiesce to the majority. who eventually acquiesced to the majority ("conforming dissenters"), and the dissenting jurors who hung the jury ("holdouts").
The following sections explore variables that differentiate between the juror groups. This section explores verdict preferences, timing, and juror ratings of vote certainty. Juror perceptions and attitudes are also considered, including jurors' perceptions of trial evidence, trial complexity, skill of the prosecution and defense attorneys, and whether all relevant evidence was presented.
The next two sections evaluate differences in how jurors perceive the evidence followed by juror deliberation processes and group interactions. Voting behaviors include whether the jury verdict favored acquittal or conviction, trial stages, vote timing, and the use of secret ballots. Variables such as the views of the deliberation process, and whether the law and legally correct outcomes were fair are compared across groups. Juror characteristics including gender, race, education, and age are also explored as potential explanatory factors. Tables 1 and 2 provide summary statistics for most of these explanatory variables. As described below, Tables 3, 4 , and 5 display the responses of each of the three comparison groups (the majority, the conforming dissenters, and the holdouts) on important explanatory variables.
The willingness to hold out was linked to whether the one-person jury verdict favored conviction or acquittal, and shows a clearly asymmetrical pattern. Of the 167 jurors who said their one-person jury verdict was an acquittal but the jury's majority favored a conviction, 59 jurors, or 35%, ultimately hung the jury. In contrast, of the 184 jurors who said their one-person jury verdict was a conviction but the jury's majority favored an acquittal, just 23, or 12.5%, hung the jury.
Aside from conviction versus acquittal verdict preferences, several other differences emerged across these three groups of jurors. Reports of the stages of the trial during which they changed their minds differed somewhat, as shown in Comparing verdict preference shifts from first to final vote similarly reflects this indecisiveness. Only 17% of the conforming dissenters remained steady between their first and final votes. In contrast, 45% of those in the majority and 43% of holdouts remained steady throughout the votes, demonstrating that conforming dissenters have difficulty deciding on a verdict ( 2 (2) = 14.80, p < .05). Table 2 shows the relationship between demographic factors and conformity or dissent. Although there are no statistically significant differences as a function of race, education, and gender, we present these variables because it is common belief that demographic characteristics are associated with dissent. The age distribution was not significantly associated with dissention ( 2 (10) = 13.67, p = .188).
[Insert Table 2 here] 2. Differences in Perceptions of Evidence. Dissenting jurors also differ from the majority on their perceptions of the evidence. See Table 3 . Dissenting jurors were skeptical that all the relevant evidence was presented in the case. According to dissenting jurors, the prosecution was less skillful and the prosecution's case was judged to be weaker. Dissenters also reported less satisfaction with the manner in which the trial was conducted. Holdouts, but not conforming dissenters, thought the police were less believable. By and large, it appears that the dissenting jurors were more skeptical of the strength of the prosecution's case and whether all of the evidence was presented.
Interestingly, the only dimension of evidence for which there were no statistical differences among the groups pertained to the expert testimony. Jurors in all groups reported it was relatively easy to understand the expert's testimony.
[Insert Table 3 here]
Differences in Deliberations.
When jurors were asked about the deliberation process and juror interactions, juries with dissenters, as expected, indicated there was more conflict and more time spent convincing one another to arrive at a verdict. See Table 4 . The mean ratings suggest that the deliberations were not overly contentious (M = 3.5 on a 7 point scale where 7 = "a great deal of conflict"). However, juries with a dissenter were more likely to report that one or two people dominated discussions.
Dissenting jurors reported that they participated more in deliberations, but felt they were less influential. Additionally, dissenters recalled that their jury was less open-minded and that each juror's viewpoint was not as thoroughly considered. Again, the ratings along these dimensions were relatively high overall, indicating jurors generally saw one another as open-minded, but this was less true for dissenting jurors. Understandably, dissenting jurors were more surprised with others' votes and less satisfied with both the deliberations and the final decision.
[Insert Table 4 here]
When dissenting jurors conformed to the majority, they were more likely to state that there was less time to express their views. In line with their greater uncertainty, as reported above, jurors who were passive in their dissent were more likely to say that it was hard for them to personally decide on a verdict as compared to the other groups.
Responses to these two questions distinguished the two types of dissenting jurors, holdouts and conforming dissenters. The latter were more frustrated in making the decision personally and in expressing their verdict preference.
Dissenting jurors judged the law and the legally correct outcome as less fair than the majority jurors. See Table 5 . However, the actual scores suggest that overall, jurors felt the law was relatively fair (Mean = approximately 5 on a 7-point scale, in which 7 = very fair).
[Insert Table 5 here]
D. Multivariate Analyses
Several multivariate statistical models assessed differences among majority and dissenting jurors. The models accommodated for the fact that jurors on the same jury are not independent by using a nested design that set each jury as a principal sampling unit.
22 22 Complementary log-log models provide an alternative to logistic and probit analysis for binary response variables. A complementary log-log function is asymmetrical and appropriate when the probability of an event, in this case dissention, is small. In addition to the complementary log-log models presented in Tables 6 through 8 , a two-stage probit model was explored. The rationale behind performing a two-stage probit analysis is to determine whether a selection effect is present. It makes sense to consider a two-stage model, since the existence of holdout jurors at the second stage is dependent on the existence of dissenting jurors at the first stage. The results of the two-stage model analysis demonstrate that there was no selection effect (rho = 0), as determined by a Wald test of independent equations (Wald 2 (1) = .13, Prob. 2 =.
The first set of models differentiates majority jurors from dissenting jurors. The second model predicts conforming dissenters from holdout jurors. A third set of models predicts dissenters from holdout jurors, but explores the orientation of the dissenter (acquittal-or conviction-prone). Previous analyses on these data have revealed significant variations between the four jurisdictions. 23 Thus, when possible, the models also provide for a subsequent breakdown by site.
The first model, shown in Table 6 , predicts dissenters (both holdouts and conforming dissenters) from those whose one-person verdicts align with the majority.
Note that both jurors arguing for conviction and jurors arguing for acquittal are included in the dissenters group in this model, and also that acquittal-prone dissenters are more common than conviction-prone dissenters. Thus this first model reflects multifaceted views of jurors. Predictor variables included the site, voting behaviors and procedures, evidentiary issues, juror demographic characteristics, and juror attitudes.
[Insert Table 6 here]
The model results confirm the univariate analyses that procedural factors are important. Dissenters were more likely to hold secret ballots and vote earlier in the deliberation process. Perceptions of the difficulty of the evidence were also useful in predicting group membership. Dissenters were more likely than majority jurors to agree that the evidence was difficult to understand. Juror views of fairness were also key to predicting dissent. Dissenting jurors believed that the consequences of a conviction, the applicable law, and the legally correct outcome were only moderately fair to the 7229). As a result of this finding, separate complementary log-log models, with controls for the nesting of jurors within juries, are presented in this article. 23 The conviction rates ranged from a high of 63% in Maricopa County to a low of 33% in Bronx County and DC. The hung jury rate (hanging on any charge presented to the jury) ranged from a high of 23% in DC to a low of 7% in Maricopa County. Hannaford et al., supra note 3.
defendant (averages were approximately 4 on a 7-point scale), whereas majority jurors saw these dimensions as significantly more fair. Neither the jurors' racial and ethnic background nor their level of education predicted dissention.
The site-specific models, also shown in Table 6 , illustrate that location matters.
The particular factors that predict dissent vary somewhat depending on the jurisdiction.
Procedurally, dissenting jurors in LA and Bronx counties were more likely to use secret ballots, and in the Bronx, they began forming an opinion about the defendant's guilt later than those in the majority. In Maricopa County, dissenting jurors were less certain during the jury's first vote. Dissenting jurors from DC and Maricopa County indicated more difficulty understanding the evidence in comparison to the majority jurors in these jurisdictions. In LA, dissenting jurors were more apt than majority jurors to say that the evidence did not strongly favor one side.
Despite differences across sites, there were some common patterns. Across all of the models (i.e., locations) jurors' demographic variables failed to differentiate dissenters from jurors who voted with the majority. Juror attitudes about fairness contributed to dissention in all four sites. All dissenters, except those in the Bronx, were more apt than majority jurors to feel that the legally correct outcome was unfair. In the Bronx, dissenters felt that the consequences of conviction were too lenient. This might be expected in a site with a high acquittal rate such as the Bronx, as dissenting jurors who favored conviction there were more common than those who favored acquittal as was true for the other sites. Overall, juror attitudes about fairness appear to drive their propensity to dissent. However, because these models combine pro-acquittal and pro-conviction dissenters, and dissenters who conform and those who hang the jury, they do not tell the full story.
So now for the Henry Fonda question: What are the differences between dissenters who conform to the majority and those who choose to hold out and hang the jury? Results from the second set of multivariate models predict holdouts from conformers. Although previous analyses demonstrate that location matters, because of the small sample size of holdout jurors, this model does not incorporate a breakdown by site.
See Table 7 . Once again, but perhaps surprisingly, demographic characteristics do not predict which dissenters acquiesce to the majority and which hold out. Instead, holdout dissenters rated police testimony as less believable. Holdouts indicated more certainty on the jury's first vote, but even though these jurors hung the jury, they felt they were less influential during jury deliberations. Perhaps the influence felt by conforming dissenters was because they were able to elicit a compromise with other jurors in exchange for their vote.
[Insert Table 7 here]
Since a dissenter can argue either for a conviction or an acquittal, we expected that these two groups are distinctively motivated. Therefore, in a third set of multivariate models, dissenters were split into subgroups --dissenters who were conviction-prone and those who were acquittal-prone. Confirming the asymmetric bias noted earlier, dissenting conformists more often argued for guilt while the more numerous holdouts favored acquittal. Sixty percent of conforming dissenters voted to convict, while 72% of holdouts voted to acquit. Table 8 shows the multivariate models for the acquittal-prone dissenters and the conviction-prone dissenters. As with the model in Table 7 , the small size of the groups precludes a site comparison.
[Insert Table 8 here] First, the model for the acquittal-prone dissenters fits the data very well. In fact, this model correctly classified jurors 86% of the time. This percent reflects an improvement of 39% over a naïve control model (predicting jurors will always conform).
Acquittal-prone dissenters who held out to hang their juries were more certain about their first vote and were more likely to be in a jury that polled jurors through a secret ballot.
Holdouts indicated there was more time to express their views than conforming dissenters, yet also believed they were less influential. The model also reveals that perceived fairness matters. Holdouts for an acquittal rated the legally correct outcome as less fair (Mean = 4.0) than the conforming dissenters who favored acquittal (Mean = 4.8).
Although the differences are small according to a bivariate comparison, the multivariate model identifies Hispanics are more likely than Caucasians to be among the holdouts to acquit. This emphasizes the importance of incorporating multiple factors in prediction models. Although site controls were not included in the model due to the number of observations at this level, an inspection of the site distribution of the Hispanic dissenters did not show a site clustering; rather, the Hispanic dissenters were spread across the sites. Finally, acquittal-prone holdouts believed they understood the expert evidence better than the conforming dissenters who favored acquittal.
As for the conviction-prone dissenters who held out or conformed, they too differed on expert evidence perceptions, such that conviction-prone holdouts thought they understood the expert evidence better than their conforming colleagues. There were no race or ethnicity effects for conviction-prone dissenters. The only other significant predictor was that holdouts for conviction found it personally more difficult to reach a decision than those who conformed to acquit the defendant. Those who conformed felt they were marginally (p = .055) more influential than the holdout jurors. It is possible that conforming dissenters were, in fact, able to effect compromises in the jury's eventual verdict, or that there simply was more successful normative and informative influence operating in the acquitting juries than in juries where a convicting minority hung the jury.
IV. DISCUSSION
The data collected as part of the NIJ-funded NCSC hung jury study continue to
show value in addressing a wide range of research issues, including questions analyzed in this article about the formation of jurors' individual opinions in felony trials and the relationship between these individual views and group verdicts. Overall, the results confirm some prior research and identify new issues worthy of further exploration.
Regarding the process of opinion formation, jurors rarely report leaning toward one side or another early in the case. Instead, they more often begin to favor one side or another during the state's evidence presentation, the defense evidence presentation, and even in the jury deliberation. Jurors report often changing their minds during the trial.
This presents a more fluid and flexible picture of juror decision making than that suggested by the pundits who say the trial's all over after the opening statements.
It's useful to contrast the Hannaford et al. civil jury study of opinion formation and change with the current project. There are some remarkable similarities; low numbers of both civil and criminal jurors say they began leaning toward one side during opening statements. Closing arguments and judicial instructions are also case segments identified by a relatively small proportion of both criminal and civil jurors. About one in five civil and criminal jurors say they began leaning toward one side during jury deliberations.
The evidentiary portions of the trial dominate all other segments in both types of trials, but the prosecution's evidence in criminal trials is apparently more influential. For example, 24% of civil jurors say they began leaning toward one side during the plaintiff's evidence, compared to over 37% of criminal jurors who say they began leaning during the prosecution's evidence. The defense evidence is slightly more important in civil trials (19%) than in criminal trials (15%).
Analyses of the relationship between individual juror preferences and final jury decisions reinforce their strong connection, found in earlier analyses of this data set, other studies of jurors, and mock jury experiments. 24 However, one unique contribution of our analysis is to complicate the notion of the juror's individual preference, and indeed, of jury unanimity. We measured jurors' verdict preferences in several different ways, asking which side they favored, their initial and final votes, and their one-person jury verdicts.
Although all of these are strongly related, they are not identical. What is more, the analyses reveal that a sizable proportion of jurors eventually voted in line with the group but at odds with their personal preferences. A substantial minority of jurors, if given the chance to decide the verdict alone, say they would have voted against their jury's decision.
Despite the complications interpreting the question, it's worth considering why a sizeable proportion of jurors report a one-person jury verdict that differs from the jury's decision. In addition to group factors that influence conformity, jurors' views of the evidence, jurors' sense of fairness, and deliberation procedures were all found to be related to the likelihood they would dissent. We also propose that juror role expectations affected dissenting jurors' willingness to go along with the majority.
Classic studies in social psychology on social pressure to conform have found that individuals regularly conform to the majority views of a group, particularly if they are alone and without other supporters, and we see that operating in the jury context.
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Minority faction size is critical to predicting the final outcome. In this study, the chances of a jury reaching a verdict decreased with an increase in the minority faction size.
Larger factions produced the strength and support needed to sustain deliberations and were more apt to hang the jury.
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Aspects of the trial evidence may hold the key to juror conformity and dissent. If the evidence does not strongly support one side, others may more easily persuade a juror to compromise. Recall that dissenting jurors who conformed were more uncertain about the evidence and found it more difficult to come to a firm decision about the merits of the case. Whether the bulk of the evidence favors the prosecution or the defense also seems
important. An asymmetric bias was not found in comparisons of first to final votes of juries, but it did emerge as we examined dissenting jurors who conformed to the majority or who hung the jury. In terms of other factors that might persuade an individual to acquiesce to the majority verdict preference, we suggest that jurors' role expectations are important. First, the dissenting juror may be adhering to the formal letter of the law, even though that is at odds with their common sense justice. Judicial instructions provide jurors with a legal framework to apply the evidence they heard. Jurors may believe the legally correct outcome to be unfair, but choose to follow the instructions and thus acquiesce to the legally correct majority preference, even though they, personally, wish for the opposite result. Jurors aren't voting in line with their personal preferences (or conscience) but they are following their interpretation of the law. Our results indicate that jurors who dissented and hung the jury believed the legally correct outcome was less fair than those in the majority.
A central part of the juror's role is arriving at a verdict unanimously or nearly unanimously. The expectation placed on all jurors from the very beginning of their jury service is that they will listen to the evidence presented at trial, apply the law as described in the jury instructions, and after discussing the evidence and law, arrive at a group consensus about the verdict. These role expectations combine with typical conformity pressures in groups to encourage jurors to accede to the majority view even if they are not privately convinced. The desire to fulfill one's job as a juror may outweigh one's individual verdict preferences in some cases.
In addition to evidentiary and role concerns, a third explanation suggests that structural aspects of deliberations influenced the extent to which jurors' verdict preferences were reflected in the jury's final verdict. Dissenting jurors were more likely to vote early in the deliberation process and to use secret ballots. Vote timing and use of secret ballots tend to co-occur, and are more likely to be present in contentious or complex cases from an evidentiary, group, or political perspective. However, they could also be important causal variables in their own right. For instance, the timing of the vote and the public versus private expression of individual views might well encourage or discourage jurors to voice their opinions. Effective leadership might facilitate the full exchange of views which would lead to genuine opinion influence. Our results reveal that dissenting jurors were more apt than majority jurors that one or two jurors dominated deliberations and, as expected, there was more conflict on the jury.
What all of this suggests is that, contrary to Kalven and Zeisel's sense that jury deliberations are unimportant, deliberations play a vital role in generating juror consensus, the consensus that comes from opinion change as well as from conformity to the majority view. These data also shed new light on the current debate over the requirement that juries be unanimous in their verdict. 28 What seems clear is that unanimous jury decisions include not only those cases in which there is genuine agreement but also a significant number of cases in which jurors "agree to disagree" and acquiesce. Jury decisions are not unique in this regard. Empirical studies of appellate decision making confirm many anecdotal reports that judges behave strategically to maximize their policy objectives, and that includes voting in line with the majority despite holding contrary private views. 29 Accommodations that occur among members of a panel or court include reducing the ideological tone of majority opinions, modifying sections of opinions, and rendering mixed decisions in which benefits are provided to both parties. A norm of judicial consensus promotes the legitimacy of the court, just as apparent jury unanimity enhances the legitimacy of the jury and its verdict. * Indicates the coefficient is significant at p < .05.
Acquittal-Prone Dissenters (N=121)
Conviction-Prone Dissenters (N=113)
Note. Table reflects results of a complementary log-log regression model that accounts for the nonindependence of jurors who sat on the same case.
